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STATEMENT OF ISSDES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO ENTER A WRIT OF MANDATE AGAINST THE 
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT, CLAY K. IVERSON. 
The Respondent/Appellant, Clay K. Iverson (Mr. 
Iverson), has listed four major and fifteen subsidiary issues in 
his opening brief. £&& Brief of Appellant at iii and iv. How-
ever, Mr. Iverson appealed only the "matter of JURISDICTION" to 
this court. (R-138 and 141). In addition, the first three 
points argued in Mr. Iverson1s brief are all subsumed in the 
jurisdictional issue presented above. Mr. Iverson1s final issue 
(whether the district court had sufficient evidence before it to 
enter the Writ of Mandate against him) was not mentioned in the 
two separate Notices of Appeal nor in the proceedings below. 
Thus, it cannot be an issue on appeal. &££, e.g., State ex reh 
Connor v. Irwin. 379 P.2d 309 (Kan. 1963); Moore v. Brown, 527 
p.2d 132 (Or. App. 1974). See also; Carson v. Douglas, 367 p.2d 
46 2 (Utah 196 2). 
Nonetheless, the Petitioner/Respondent (Utah State Tax 
Commission) has briefed all the issues Mr. Iverson argues on 
appeal. 
- v -
gTATPTQRY PROVISIONS 
DTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Artic le VIII. Judicial Department 
Sec. 1 . [Judicial powers - Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as 
the district courtr and in such other courts as the Legislature 
by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, 
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by 
statute. 
July 1, 1985 
Sec. 5 . [Jurisdiction of d i s t r i c t court and other 
courts - Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed original-
ly with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal 
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
January 1, 1945 
July 1, 1985 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Tit le 59, Chapter 14A. Individual Income Tax Act of 1973 
Section 48 
An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by 
this act shall be filed by: 
(a) Every resident individual, estate or trust re-
quired to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year; 
-
 Vi _ 
(b) Every nonresident individual9 estate or trust 
having federal gross income derived from sources within the state 
for the taxable year and required to file a federal income tax 
return for such taxable year. 
1973 
Title 59, Chapter 31. Termination and Jeopardy Assessments 
Procedure 
Section 7. Writ of mandate requiring taxpayer to 
file return. 
(1) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required 
pursuant to Title 59 within 60 days of the time prescribed/ the 
state tax commission may petition for a writ of mandate to compel 
the taxpayer to file the return. The petition may be filed, in 
the discretion of the tax commission/ in the tax court of the 
third judicial district or in the district court for the county 
in which the taxpayer resides or has his principal place of busi-
ness. In the case of a nonresident taxpayer the petition shall 
be filed in the third district court. 
The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for a 
writ of mandate within 20 days after the filing of the petition 
or as soon thereafter as the court may determine, having regard 
for the rights of the parties and the necessity of a speedy 
determination of the petition. 
Upon a finding of failure to file a return within 60 
days of the time prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the court shall 
issue a writ of mandate requiring the taxpayer to file a return. 
The order of the court shall include an award of attorneys1 fees, 
court costs, witness fees and all other costs in favor of the 
prevailing party. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall limit the remedies 
otherwise available to the state tax commission under Title 59 or 
other laws of this state. 
1983 
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Case No. 20965 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
000O000 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
v* 
CLAY K. IVERSON, 
Respondent-Appellant* 
000O000 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT 
STATEjlgNT OF Tgg CASE 
Mature of the Case 
Mr. Iverson has appealed the Writ of Mandate entered 
against him by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup of the Tax Court 
Division of the Third Judicial District Court. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court 
On August 13, 1985, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup of 
the Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District Court 
issued a Writ of Mandate and Judgment against Mr. Iverson com-
pelling him to file state individual income tax returns for the 
years 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 on or before September 13, 1985, 
The order further awarded a judgment in the amount of $1,097.30 
for attorneys' fees and costs. Mr. Iverson appealed that order 
on September 12, 1985. 
Thereafter Mr. Iverson filed a Demand for Relief from 
Writ of Mandate. 
On September 19, 1985, the district court entered an-
other Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Mr. Iverson1s Demand 
for Relief from Writ and Judgment, but suspending the attorneys1 
fees and cost award until such time that another hearing could be 
held solely on that issue. The district court has not entered a 
final order with respect to attorneys1 fees and costs. 
On October 18, 1985, Mr. Iverson appealed the Writ of 
Mandate on jurisdictional grounds. 
ftelief Sought on Appeal 
The Petitioner/Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, 
seeks on appeal an affirmation of the Writ of Mandate entered by 
the district court. 
STftTPHPET OF FACTS 
The Utah State Tax Commission (Tax Commission) does not 
accept Mr. Iverson1s "Statement of the Facts" as totally 
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accurate, complete or relevant.1 The Tax Commission hereinafter 
argues that entry of the Writ of Mandate against Mr. Iverson was 
basedr in partf upon Mr. Iverson1s own misconduct before the dis-
trict courtr and for that reason, here recites a complete state-
ment of facts with references to page numbers in the record. 
On May 20, 1985, the Respondent/Appellant, Clay K. 
Iverson, was served with a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate 
and Notice of Hearing, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 59-31-7 
(1953), as amended. (R-14). The salient allegations of the 
petition were that: (1) Mr. Iverson was a resident of the state 
of Utah "gainfully employed ... [who] earned commission income" 
during the years 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982. The petition further 
alleges that Mr. Iverson failed to "complete individual income 
For example, Mr. Iverson states that he is "a free and natural 
person" and "is not the recipient of any special grant from the 
State; that is, he is not a privileged person such as a firm, 
partnership, association, corporation, franchise, ect [sic]." 
Brief of Appellant at 5 paragraphs 1 and 2. To Mr. Iverson, 
these statements of "fact" are apparently very important. Mr. 
Iverson concludes in one of his pleadings that "My labor is my 
property and is mine and mine only ... I do not voluntarily share 
this enjoyment with the State of Utah through contract agreement. 
I am a FREEMAN, A MERCHANT AT LAW dealing on a cash basis and I 
do not owe a reporting to the State of Utah for some contract 
agreement placing me under privilege, incorporation or 
franchise." (R-16). Mr. Iverson's apparent purpose in 
reaffirming his status as a "Freeman" is to suggest that the 
state of Utah cannot tax his "cash basis" transactions unless he 
has "reduced this [his] STATUS with equity contract with the 
State of Utah under Civil Roman Law." (R-15). While the Tax 
Commission is not entirely clear what Mr. Iverson means by 
"Freeman" or "equity contract under Civil Roman Law," it agrees 
with the district court that "a natural man argument doesn't make 
it!,]" (R-235) or, in other words, is irrelevant. 
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tax returns, Forms TC-40 or the appropriate alternate forms, for 
the above-mentioned taxable years." (R-3) • 
On June 5, 1985 Mr. Iverson filed a document entitled 
•Verified Statement of Refutation, Declaration of Status and 
Verified Statement of Pacts." This document declared that Mr. 
Iverson was a "FREEMAN, A MERCHANT AT LAW," that he had "rid 
himself of TAXPAYER STATUS!,]" and that, therefore, he "no longer 
participate Id] in Government granted privilege and [was] thus not 
a 'person required1 to make reports." (R-16). This document 
went on to make various jurisdictional arguments, declarations 
and allegations. 
At the initial hearing on the Tax Commission's peti-
tion, held June 7, 1985, Mr. Iverson challenged the court's 
jurisdiction (R-160); challenged the court's denial of a request 
to be represented by lay counsel (R-162); argued that the court 
could not issue writs of mandate before a Tax Commission hearing 
was held (R-179); claimed that the retention of an attorney, as a 
member of the "judicial department," granted jurisdiction 
(R-163); objected to being called before the court (R-178); 
argued that the Tax Commission had abused its discretion by 
filing its Petition for Writ of Mandate in the third judicial 
district (R-182); and argued that the court's designation as a 
"tax judge" deprived it of jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate 
(R-188) . 
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Also at that hearing, the Tax Commission called one 
witnessf the Tax Commission employee who had helped prepare the 
Tax Commission's Petition for Writ of Mandate in the Iverson 
case, and unsuccessfully attempted to introduce an Internal 
Revenue Service audit of Mr. Iverson1s financial affairs into 
evidence. (R-169). The Tax Commission then conceded that the 
court appropriately excluded the federal audit as hearsay, 
(R-177) and proposed instead to call Mr. Iverson for the purpose 
of confirming the allegations of the petition, namely that Mr. 
Iverson was a resident of the state of Utah, that he had not 
filed state tax returns for the years in question and that he had 
received taxable income for those years. But after Mr. Iverson1s 
cross-examination of the Tax Commission's witness, it became 
apparent to the court that "we're still going to go through with 
a lot of argumentative questions and a lot of questions about 
foundation, about the very nature of things." (R-218). Hence, 
the matter was continued. 
In the meantime, a Subpoena Duces Tecum was issued to 
Mr. Iverson commanding him to appear and give testimony at oral 
deposition to be taken by the Tax Commission at its Provo office 
on July 19, 1985. The Subpeona commanded Mr. Iverson to bring 
with him various records evincing his financial dealings. 
(R-93). On July 15, 1985, Mr. Iverson filed a Motion to Quash 
the Subpoena Duces Tecum, specifically on the grounds that the 
court's jurisdiction had "been squarely challenged, but has not 
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as yet been determined.* (R-97). On July 19, Mr. Iverson ap-
peared at the designated place for taking the deposition, but 
refused to testify. (R-230). 
A hearing on Mr. Iverson1s Motion to Quash was held on 
July 22, 1985. At that time, Mr. Iverson again argued jurisdic-
tional issues, but the court made no decision. On August 9, 
1985, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Iverson1s 
Motion to Dismiss. That order acknowledged that Mr. Iverson had 
challenged the court's jurisdiction on the following grounds: 
(1) The statutory language of the "Writ of 
Mandate" statute ... is unconstitutionally 
vague; (2) The statutory options available to 
the State Tax Commission (Writ of Man-
date ... or Deficiency Assessment ...) vio-
late constitutional guarantees to equal pro-
tection ...; (3) iThe Writ of Mandate 
statute] is placed in the "Termination and 
Jeopardy" section of Title 59 and no facts 
have been alleged showing jeopardy; (4) This 
Court has no jurisdiction to hear petitions 
for a Writ of Mandate until a formal hearing 
has been rendered by the Tax Commission; and 
that (5) The Petition for the Writ was not 
properly verified. (R-120). 
The district court found that each of the foregoing 
arguments, two of which are repeated on appeal as points I and II 
in Mr. Iverson's brief, were "without merit." i d . In open 
court, the district court later explained that "I think your [Mr. 
Iverson1s] arguments are totally without merit, but rather than 
incite riot, or whatever, I simply chose to take the word out so 
that it reads, "without merit." (R-236). 
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A third hearing was held in the case on August 13, 
1985. At this hearing, the Tax Commission called Mr. Iverson as 
a witness in order to confirm the allegations of the Petition. 
(R-233).2 Mr. Iverson then refused to take the oath as adminis-
tered by the clerk of the court (R-85A)3 and either refused to 
answer questions asked by counsel for the Tax Commission or an-
swered evasively. (R-236, 237) .4 Whereupon the court inter-
jected itself, disallowed further questions and answers and 
ordered that the Writ of Mandate be entered. (R-238). The court 
further commented that "if you [Mr. Iverson] traded cows for 
Mr. Iverson had already admitted the essential allegations of 
the Petition. Specifically he admitted that he was a resident of 
the state of Utah for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982 
(R-236), that he had not filed tax returns for those years (R-
158), and that he received income, or in Mr. Iverson1s words that 
"I am ... a MERCHANT AT LAW dealing on a cash basis..." and that 
"I could exchange my labor for property." Verified Statement of 
Refutation at 2 (R-16). Mr. Iverson, of course, takes the 
position that an exchange of labor for property is not income 
upon which he must pay taxes (R-17). 
Mr. Iverson later explained that he refused to take the oath 
for theological reasons. The "Asseveration of Clay K. Iverson" 
(R-269) states that "truth" as defined in section 93 verse 24 and 
25 of the Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints is, in part, "knowledge of things as they are 
...to come; and whatsoever is more or less that this is the 
spirit of that wicked one who was a liar from the beginning." 
With that definition of "truth" in mind, Mr. Iverson replied "I 
can't" when asked if he would tell the truth. By his refusal to 
take the oath, Mr. Iverson could avoid "participating with that 
wicked one who was a lier Isic] from the beginning." (R-270). 
4 The complete text of Mr. Iverson1s exchange with counsel for 
the Tax Commission is reproduced in Argument, Point IV of this 
brief. 
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horses, you received income in kindf and that's deemed income 
under the tax laws. Do you understand that?" (R-239). Counsel 
for the Tax Commission then asked the court to take judicial 
notice that Mr. Iverson1s services, exchanged for property or 
substance, were worth at least the minimum wage, which request 
was granted. (R-239). 
On August 23, 1985, Mr. Iverson filed a Demand for Re-
lief from Writ of Mandate and scheduled a hearing for September 
6. Mr. Iverson1s Demand for Relief argued that the court had no 
jurisdiction over him because he was served with a Petition for 
Writ of Mandate and Notice of Hearing rather than a Summons and a 
Complaint. Counsel for the Tax Commission did not attend the 
hearing on September 6, 1985, although he filed an objection to 
Mr. Iverson1s Demand for Relief, arguing essentially that per-
sonal service of the Petition for the Writ and Notice of Hearing 
obviated the necessity for service of summons. (R-134). 
On September 12, 1985, before any order had been issued 
on Mr. Iverson1s Demand for Relief from Writ of Mandate, Mr. 
Iverson appealed the district court's Writ of Mandate and Judg-
ment. Notice of Appeal, No. 1 (R-138). The first notice of 
appeal states that "This appeal is made on the subject matter of 
jurisdiction of the Tax Court relative to the statutes of the 
state of Utah, particularly Title 59 U.C.A., as they apply in 
this particular case." On September 19, 1985, the district court 
entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Mr. Iverson1s 
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Demand for Relief, but suspending the attorneys1 fees and cost 
award until such time that another hearing could be held specif-
ically on that issue. The district court has not entered a final 
order with respect to attorneys1 fees and costs. 
On October 18, 1985, Mr. Iverson filed a Notice of Ap-
peal from the order signed September 19, 1985. Here again, Mr. 
Iverson appealed the district court's jurisdiction, stating that, 
"This appeal is made on the subject matter of JURISDICTION (cap-
italization in original) of the Tax Court relative to the stat-
utes of the state of Utah, particularly Title 59 U.C.A., as they 
apply in this particular case." (R-141). 
On November 18, 1985, the Tax Commission filed a Motion 
for Summary Disposition with this court on the basis that "the 
grounds for review [of the district court's Writ of Mandate] are 
so frivolous and insubstantial as not to merit further proceed-
ings and consideration by this Court." Motion for Summary Dis-
position at 1. This motion was "reserved for plenary presenta-
tion and consideration by the Court." Minute Entry, No. 20 965 
(Sept. 4, 1985) . 
gPMMART OF ARGUMENT 
All Mr. Iverson1s arguments are frivolous. 
Point I 
Section 59-31-7 of the Utah Code authorizes district 
courts to issue writs of mandate to compel Utah residents to file 
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their state tax returns if they have not filed them, but nonethe-
less have a legal obligation to do so. Section 59-24-1 through 9 
of the Utah Code, the Tax Court Act, provides that the tax divi-
sion of state district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear appeals from the Utah State Tax Commission. This grant 
of exclusive jurisdiction to tax courts, however, does not mean, 
as Mr. Iverson argues, that he was entitled to a Tax Commission 
hearing and decision before the district court had jurisdiction 
to issue the Writ of Mandate. 
Point II 
Mr. Iverson was served with a Petition for Writ of 
Mandate and a Notice of Hearing. Personal service of those 
documents is sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over 
Mr. Iverson. It was not necessary to serve Mr. Iverson with a 
Summons and Complaint because no "Answer" as such is required as 
a responsive pleading to the petition. Writ of mandate proceed-
ings are similar to injunctive proceedings. They are specially 
authorized by statute and thus do not conform to the ordinary 
civil actions described in Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The placement of section 59-31-7, the "writ of mandate" 
section in the "Jeopardy and Assessment" chapter of the Utah Code 
does not mean that the Petition for a Writ of Mandate must allege 
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an emergency or jeopardy situation. By the terms of section 
59-31-7, the district court miiat issue a writ of mandate, upon 
petition filed by the Dtah State Tax Commission/ to individuals 
required by law to file their state tax returns but who have not 
filed those returns. 
Point IY 
The evidence before the district court was overwhelm-
ingly conclusive that Mr. Iverson was required by law to file his 
state tax returns, but did not file them. In addition to Mr. 
Iverson1s own pleadings, and judicial notice of Mr. Iverson1s 
receipt of income, Mr. Iverson himself, through his devious and 
non-responsive conduct before the court (R-242), effectively 
admitted the allegations of the petition. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE 
A WRIT OF MANDATE. 
Mr. Iverson argues that as a "Tax Court," legislatively 
created under the Tax Court Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-1 through 
9 (1953) , as amended, the district court cannot issue writs of 
mandate unless the Tax Commission has first made a decision with 
respect to that particular taxpayer after a formal hearing. 
Brief of Appellant at 12 and 13. Mr. Iverson then argues that 
"there is some confusion as to whether the general jurisdictional 
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powers of the District Court spread over the Tax Court!,]" and 
concludes "Itlhis case does not fall within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Tax Court and cannot be determined by it." Id. 
Although the Tax Commission confesses some difficulty 
in following Mr. Iverson1s argument, it is, in syllogistic for-
mat, apparently this: (1) The tax division of the district court 
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Tax Commis-
sion; (2) Mr. Iverson1s case was not first heard by the Tax Com-
mission; and therefore, (3) The district court sitting as a tax 
court judge had no jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Mandate. To 
make the foregoing logic intelligible, Mr. Iverson reads the word 
"exclusive" in the Tax Court Act as barring the district court, 
sitting as a tax court, from taking action in any matter not 
first considered and determined by the Tax Commission. Brief of 
Appellant at 15. 
The foregoing argument is demonstrably frivolous for 
three reasons: 
First, and most important, state district courts have 
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate because the legislature 
has given them that power in Utah Code Ann. § 59-31-7 (1953), as 
amended. That statute says in relevant part that "If a taxpayer 
fails to file any return required..., the state tax commission 
may petition for a writ of mandate to compel the taxpayer to file 
the return ... upon a finding of failure to file a return ... the 
court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring the taxpayer to 
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file a return* • S&S. Statutory Provisions at page vi of this 
brief for a complete quotation of section 59-31-7. 
There is no language in section 5 9-31-7 that states or 
implies that a non-filing taxpayer is first entitled to a hearing 
before the Tax Commission. The following exchange between the 
district court and Mr. Iverson best illustrates the convoluted 
logic of Mr. Iverson1s argument: 
MR. IVERSON: Well, I was under the impres-
sion, according to their petition, that I was 
to appear before a tax judge. 
THE COURT: I am the designated tax judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
MR. IVERSON: As a tax judge — 
THE COURT: I am a District Court Judge. 
MR. IVERSON: I agree, but as a tax judge you 
derive your jurisdiction through Title 59, 
the tax — 
THE COURT: No, I do not. I am a District 
Judge and I have all the powers of a District 
Judge, and there is a whole chapter in the 
new code that tells you of the powers of the 
District Courts ... 
(R-188). 
Mr. Iverson1s argument simply ignores the language used 
in section 59-31-7 that gives state district courts jurisdiction 
to issue writs of mandate. Further, Mr. Iverson1s argument flies 
in the face of Article VIII section 1 of the Utah Constitution, 
which vests judicial power in "a trial court of general jurisdic-
tion known as the district court, and in such other courts as J±£ 
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Legislature by statute may establish, (Emphasis added)• Article 
VII section 5 of the Utah Constitution similarly states that "the 
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
except as limited by this constitution or by statute«..." The 
legislature, in other words, has plenary power to vest jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of mandate in state district courts. 
Second, the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the tax court 
division of the district court to hear appeals from the Tax Com-
mission does not mean that the tax division may hear nothing but 
appeals from the Commission. The word "exclusive" in the Tax 
Court Act obviously means that all appeals from the Tax Commis-
sion must be heard by the tax division of the district court. As 
Judge Rigtrup explained to Mr. Iverson, "This statute [59-31-7] 
simply authorizes the Tax Commission to bring writs in a tax mat-
ter before the District Court Tax Division, to order you to do 
something that the law otherwise compels you to do." (R-184). 
Mr. Iverson1s reliance upon Kennecott v» Salt Lake 
County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985) is misplaced. That case stands 
for the proposition that appeals from the Tax Commission must be 
brought in the tax division of the district court, as explained 
above. Kennecott does not in any way state or imply that all 
actions involving taxation must first be brought before the Tax 
Commission. Mr. Iverson1s reading of Kennecott forcibly obli-
terates section 59-31-7 and Article VII of the Utah Constitution. 
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Third, this court, in State Tax Commission of Utah v, 
James M. Looney, 696 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1985) has already decided 
that district courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate. 
Specifically this court in Looney held that "the legislature 
enacted the Individual Income Tax Act (contained in Title 59 of 
the Utah Code). Clearly, the state has the authority to impose 
on its citizens certain duties, including the filing of tax 
returns." Thus, the district court below had power to issue a 
writ of mandate against Mr. Iverson. 
Point II 
SERVICE OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING UPON MR. IVERSON GAVE 
THE DISTRICT COURT IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
OVER HIM. 
Mr. Iverson argues under Point II of his brief that the 
district court had no jurisdiction over him because he was not 
served with a summons and a complaint, although he was admittedly 
served with a Petition for Writ of Mandate and a Notice of Hear-
ing. (R-248) . The apparent logic here is that: (1) Rule 4(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summons must is-
sue within three months from actions commenced by the filing of a 
complaint; (2) there was no summons issued in this case; and, 
therefore (3) the district court has no in personam jurisdiction 
over Mr. Iverson. Brief of Appellant at 14. 
This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, 
filing a petition for a writ of mandate commences a legislatively 
• 15 -
authorized special action that is not therefore subsumed within 
the ordinary or usual civil actions described in Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As the district court explained: 
THE COURT: With respect to this kind of 
case, it's a statutory injunctive kind of ac-
tion, Mr. Iverson, and it's not a typical 
civil case as you have cited several thoughts 
about ... You were given notice of hearing. 
You are not compelled to file a written an-
swer to the complaint or suffer default to 
enter against you. You are basically re-
quired by the notice of hearing to appear and 
show some cause why the court ought not to 
summarily issue a writ of mandate against you 
as provided by statute. 
(R-253). 
Because a petition for a writ of mandate operates as an 
injunction to compel a respondent to file tax returns he already 
has a legal obligation to file, the appropriate procedure for is-
suance of the petition is governed by Rule 65Ar Injunctions and 
Rule 65Bf Extraordinary Writs. Rule 6 5A provides in essence that 
preliminary injunctions may issue upon notice to the adverse 
party followed by an expeditiously scheduled hearing. Similar 
procedures are outlined in Rule 65B. 
Thus, the cases upon which Mr. Iverson relies are 
easily distinguishable. Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 
1971) involved an action to collect upon insufficient funds 
checks. The Murdock Court held that proper service of summons 
was •jurisdictional" and explicitly stated that service of 
summons could not be supplanted by "mere notice." Id. at 16. 
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Likewise Piberboard v. Deitrich. 475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970) held 
that a district had no jurisdiction because summons on a com-
plaint to recover goods was not timely issued. 
Both Fiberbpard and Hurdock are inapposite to issues 
Mr. Iverson raises on appeal. Those cases expressly involved 
actions commenced by the filing of a complaint and did not in-
volve, as does this case, a petition for injunctive-type relief. 
The district court explained to Mr. Iverson when Fiberboard and 
Murdock were argued below. "No. It's not the usual civil case, 
and I donft think the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in terms of 
requiring you to file a written answer within 20 days of suffer 
default to enter." (R-255). 
Second, the Looney Court concluded that district courts 
had jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate notwithstanding Mr. 
Looney1s jurisdictional challenges. Mr. Looney apparently did 
not challenge the sufficiency of service even though he raised 
due process concerns under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution. In any event, the sufficiency of 
process is jurisdictional and thus could have been raised sua 
sponte by the court itself. S&&, e.g. , Lloyd v. Zollman, 590 
P.2d 222 (Or. 1979); Estes v. Talbot, 597 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1979). 
Since Mr. Looney was served in precisely the same manner as Mr. 
Iverson teaa Brief of Respondent in State Tax Commission v. James 
M. Looney at 3, copy attached/ Addendum I), this court should 
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find in this case, as it did in Looney, that Mr. Iverson's juris-
dictional arguments are totally without merit. 
Point III 
A PETITION FOR A WRIT OP MANDATE NEED NOT AL-
LEGE THAT COLLECTION OF ANY TAX IS IN JEO-
PARDY. 
Mr. Iverson declares in Point III of his brief that 
Title 59 chapter 31 of the Utah Code is entitled "Termination and 
Jeopardy Assessments Procedure11 and that, therefore, a petition 
for a writ of mandate brought pursuant to section 59-31-7 must 
allege "that a condition of jeopardy exists." Brief of Appellant 
at 19. 
This argument is likewise demonstrably specious. This 
court has previously held that "the intention of the Legislature 
... should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or 
word from should stand in the way of carrying out the legislative 
intent." Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt 
Lake City, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). Consequently, the validity 
of section 59-31-7 does not depend upon any particular location 
in the Utah Code. Moreover, the title of Title 5 9 chapter 3 0 is 
not law. It is merely a general identification of the provisions 
which follow. The unambiguous wording of section 59-31-7 states 
that the district court fiJiall enter a writ of mandate "Upon a 
finding of failure to file a return with 60 days of the time 
prescribed pursuant to Title 59, ..." There is no requirement 
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that the court must also find "that a condition of jeopardy 
exists." 
Point IY 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD BEFORE IT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ENTER A WRIT OF MANDATE AGAINST 
MR. IVERSON. 
Mr. Iverson1s final argument under Point IV of his 
brief is that there was insufficient evidence before the district 
court to justify entry of a writ of mandate against him. Speci-
fically, Mr. Iverson claims that the court forced him to testify, 
despite "his rights to privacy and against self incrimination," 
and further that the only evidence adduced against Mr. Iverson, a 
federal tax audit, was deemed inadmissable hearsay. Brief of Ap-
pellant at 23. 
These arguments misstate both the law and the facts. 
As a matter of law, "the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination may be employed to protect a taxpayer 
from revealing an illegal source of income, [but] it does not 
protect one from disclosing the amount of his income." United 
States v. Daryl R. Jensen, Jr.. No. 82-1648, slip op. (10th Cir. 
May 11, 1983) (unreported decision, a copy of which is attached, 
Addendum II). See also State v. Ponceletf 610 P.2d 698 (Mont. 
1980). Significantly, the Looney Court found the same "self-
incrimination" arguments (&&£ Brief of Respondent Looney at 5, 
copy attached, Addendum I) now raised by Mr. Iverson to be 
•totally without merit." 
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As a matter of fact, the evidence before the district 
court was not limited to the federal audit excluded as hearsay. 
Any one of three separate factual findings support entry of the 
Writ of Mandate against Mr. Iverson. 
First, Mr. Iverson admitted both in his pleadings and 
in open court that he received income. For example, Mr. Iverson 
in his "Verified Statement of Refutation" admits that "I do not 
work by way of privilege but as a matter of right and lay claim 
to this right as one of my God given Inalienable Rights guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution and protected by the Utah 
Constitution. In this capacity I ... work as a matter of private 
contract.* In the same pleading, Mr. Iverson further admits that 
"I am a FREEMAN, A MERCHANT AT LAW dealing on a cash basis and do 
not owe a reporting to the State of Utah for some contract agree-
ment placing me under privilege, incorporation or franchise." He 
further admits that "I do exchange property for property and do 
not engage in PUBLIC CREDIT.... My labor is my property and is 
mine and mine only for the enjoyment thereof and I do not volun-
tarily share this enjoyment with the State of Utah through con-
tract agreement." (R-16) (emphasis added). 
These admissions, made in unwithdrawn pleadings Mr. 
Iverson filed, are binding and conclusive upon him. As one 
evidence treatise explains "Thus, the court must look to the 
pleadings as part of the record in passing on the relevancy of 
evidence, and in ascertaining the issues to be submitted to the 
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jury. For these purposes it is not necessary to offer the plead-
ings in evidence. They are used as judicial and not evidential 
admissions! and fpr these purposes, until withdrawn or aroendedi 
are conclusive.» McCormick, Evidence S 265 (2nd ed. 1972) 
(emphasis added)• 
Second, Mr. Iverson's evasive and devious conduct at 
the hearing of August 23, 1985, can be and was construed as an 
admission to the allegations of the petition. Consider the fol-
lowing exchange between the courtf Mr. Iverson and counsel for 
the Tax Commission. 
BY MR> MILLER: 
Q Mr. Iversonf will you please give us 
your full name and address? 
A Clay Iverson, 4361 West 11000 North, 
Highland, Utah. 
Q How long have you resided at that 
address? 
A Six years. 
Q You have been a citizen and resident of 
the State of Utah since 1979? 
A I have been domiciled in the State of 
Utah since 1979. 
Q Have you filed any tax return with the 
State Tax Commission since 1979? 
A No. 
Q What i s your occupation? 
A Creator. 
Q What i s a creator? 
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A Hany things. 
Q Give me some s p e c i f i e d What do you 
create? 
A I don't see that has any relevance 
to ~ 
THE COURT: Answer his 
question. 
THE WITNESS: Create, 
I guess. 
Q (By Mr. Miller) What? 
A Objects. 
Q Like what? 
A (No response.) 
Q Mr. Iverson, do you remember an 
informal conference that you and I had on 
June 20th at the Salt Lake County Library? 
A I remember a conference* 
Q Do you remember telling me that some of 
the things that you created were welding, 
raising goats, performing odd jobs and 
maintenance services for other people? Do 
you recall that? 
A I have created those things, but not 
for other people always. 
Q Who do you do them for? 
A Yoi me. Poi God. 
Q Do you receive substance in return for 
these services? 
A No. 
Q Do you recall saying to me at that time 
that you received substance in return for 
those services? 
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A I don't r e c a l l . 
Q You don't r e c a l l that? Okay. Le t ' s go 
through — l e t ' s get t h i s s t r a i g h t . Do you 
do any welding? 
A I know how t o weld. 
Q Did you do any masonry — and I'm 
ta lk ing about the period of 1979 t o 1982. 
Have you done any welding for anyone? 
A (No response . ) 
Q You don't r e c a l l ? 
(R-236-238). 
The foregoing exchange demonstrates that Mr. Iverson's 
conduct at the hearing of August 23
 r 1985 obstructed justice. In 
response to two questions/ asking what he "created" or what serv-
ices he performed for othersf Mr. Iverson refused to answer. In 
response to a series of questions asking what occupation he pur-
sued/ Mr. Iverson gave evasive and incomplete answersf and at one 
point objected that questions concerning his occupation were ir-
relevant to determining his receipt of income. And in another 
instance/ when Mr. Iverson categorically denied receipt of sub-
stance for services/ he contradicted several statements in his 
"Verified Statement of Refutation"/ as quoted above. 
When it became apparent that Mr. Iverson was not 
willing to cooperate/ the court interjected itself/ stopped the 
questioning and told Mr. Iverson "I'm going to compel you to file 
a meaningful tax return within 15 daysr..." (R-238); later the 
court stated "So if you don't generate wages, then certainly the 
- 23 -
food you eat and the clothes you wear and the gas you put in your 
vehicle, and whatever you obtain by thievery or by some honest 
means, and I'm not going to sit here and require counsel to go 
through painfully question by question and have you avoid and be 
devious and nonresponsive." (R-242)• The court was well within 
its prerogative to terminate questioning and enter the Writ of 
Mandate. Again, this conclusion is supported by general evidence 
law: 
As might be expected, wrongdoing by the party 
in connection with his case, amounting to an 
obstruction of justice is also commonly re-
garded as an admission of conduct. By resort-
ing to wrongful devices he is said to give 
ground for believing he thinks his case is 
weak and not to be won by fair means. Ac-
cordingly, a party1s false statement about 
the matter in litigation, whether before 
suit, or on the stand, ... his destruction or 
concealment of relevant documents or objects, 
... all these are instances of this type 
of admission by conduct. 
McCormick, Evidence S 273 (2nd ed. 1972). 
Third, the district court took judicial notice that the 
value of Mr. Iverson's services, or his admitted exchange of 
property for property, is at least the equivalent of the federal 
minimum wage. See Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Request 
for Court to Take Judicial Notice, and remarks of counsel for the 
Tax Commission and the court at (R-239). 
Under Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-48 (1953), as amended, 
every resident individual required to file a federal income tax 
return is likewise required to file a state return. Thus, Mr. 
Iverson would be required under both state and federal law to 
file tax returns with the respective state and federal juris-
dictions if his income was at least $3,400 for a married indi-
vidual filing jointly. 26 D.S.C. S 1 (1982). Mr. Iverson1s 
income, computed at the average federal minimum wage from 1979 -
1982 of approximately $3.00 per hour, 19 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)5 as 
explained above, for a regular 40 hour week is above $6,000, well 
over the minimum level of income at which everyone must file a 
tax return. Even if the forgoing assumptions and computations 
are incorrect, Mr. Iverson1s refusal to file his tax returns or 
even answer relevant questions when ordered by the court, makes 
an accurate calculation impossible. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of Mr. Iverson1s arguments are frivolous in the 
extreme and should not be seriously entertained by this court. 
This court has already ruled in other appeals brought by tax 
protestors that state district courts have jurisdiction to issue 
writs of mandate to compel individuals such as Mr. Iverson to 
file their tax returns. There are no relevant distinctions be-
tween Mr. Iverson1s appeal and those cases. 
In addition, Mr. Iverson1s wrongful conduct frustrated 
the orderly presentation of "evidence" in this case. Mr. Iverson 
For the first year Mr. Iverson should have filed, 1979, the 
threshold was $3,200. 
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has refused to testify at a deposition, has refused to answer 
questions propounded by the court and counsel and by self-decree 
argues that he is not a "taxpayer11 and therefore cannot be com-
pelled to file a tax return. In the words of the district court 
•you [Mr. Iversonl abuse the system which you deem responsible to 
protect you, but feel that for some reason you do not have to pay 
your fair share." (R-235). This court should not permit such an 
evasion of the tax laws to occur. 
The district court should be summarily affirmed. 
DATED this ^T day of April, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
MAXWELL A; MILLER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
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ADDENDUM x 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION ] 
OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, 
v. ! 
JAMES M. LOONEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) Supreme Court No, 19913 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, STATE TAX COMMISSION 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The a p p e l l a n t , James M. Looney, i s appealing an order 
of the Tax Court D i v i s i o n of the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court 
f inding him in contempt of court for f a i l u r e t o comply with a 
writ of mandate i s s u e d by the court below. 
PISPQSITIQN IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Dean E. Conder of t h e Tax Court 
Divis ion of the Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court found Looney in 
contempt of court for f a i l i n g to comply w i th a writ of mandate 
issued by the court pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. S 59-31-7 
The State Tax Commission, on October 13, 1983, filed 
a petition for writ of mandate, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 
59-31-7(1) , in the Tax Court Division of the Third District 
Court (R-2)« Looney was properly served with notice of the 
November 3, 1983 , hearing, which hearing was continued until 
November 28, 1983 (R-18). 
On November 2 8, 1983, the State Tax Commission 
presented evidence that Looney made sufficient income to be 
required to file federal and state income tax returns for the 
years 1979, 1980, and 1981 and evidence that Looney had not 
filed income tax returns for those years (R-40-41)• On Novem-
ber 29, 1983, the court issued a writ of mandate ordering 
Looney "to file valid, accurate, and complete Utah Individual 
Income Tax Returns, Forms TC-40, for the taxable years 1979, 
1980, and 1981," with the State Tax Commission auditors within 
2 0 days (R-4 2) . 
Looney was granted an extention of time until January 
27, 1984, to comply with the writ of mandate. On January 30, 
1984, the Tax Commission received what purported to be complete 
Utah income tax returns (R-54-100). These returns contained 
zeros in all the appropriate blanks for reporting income. 
(Looney did, however, request a refund for the amounts withheld 
from his wages to pay state income taxes.) In addition, Looney 
had filed jointly but had failed to have his wife sign the 
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ADDENDUM 1-L 
EXHIBIT "A" 
NOT FOR ROUTINE PUBLICATION 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
MAY i i 19S3 
dog 
riTED STATES OF AMERICA, 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l e e , 
kRYL R. JENSEN, J r . , 
Defendant-Appel lant , 
wo. 82-1648 
Appeal Frosi the United States District Court 
For the District of Utah, Central Division 
(D.C. No. CR-B2-00012W) 
na Campbell, Assistant United States Attorney (Brent D. Uard, 
iited States Attorney^ with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, 
ah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
on D. Roberts of Roberts & Roberts, Salt Lcke City, Utah, for 
fendant-Appellant 
fore BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 
.RRETT, Circuit Judge. 
Daryl R. Jensen (Jensen) appeals his jury convictions of 
failure to file an income tax return for 1978 and 1979 in 
violation of 26 U.S.C.A. .§ 7203. Jensen was found not guilty 
of failure to file a 1977 income tax return. 
During trial the Government established that: Jensen filed 
appropriate tax returns for 1972, 1974, 1975 and 1976; Jensen 
earned $31,492.44 in 1977, $38,715.42 in 1978, and $30,621 in 
1979; Jensen's 1977, 1978 and 1979 tax returns did not set 
forth earned income and were completed with the words "ncne" 
and "object-self incrimination"; Jensen was notified that the 
returns were unacceptable as filed, that additional forms would 
have to be filed, and that failure to provide income for the 
years in question could result in criminal prosecution, in 1977 
Jensen filed withholding certificates with his employers in 
which he claimed up to 100 exemptions; and that in 1978 and 
1979 Jensen filed withholding certificates in which he claimed 
to be exempt from all federal withholding tax. 
The Government also introdu^^a two letters received from 
Jensen in which he expressed his "good faith belief in his 
right to object to the information sought, provided legal 
support for his position, and suggested what actions the 
Government should take with regard to challenging the validity 
of his claims." [Appellant's brief at p. 3]. 
Jensen did not testify or call any witnesses. Prior to 
closing arguments of c-nsel, the district court ruled: 
Jensen's good faith esse: en of his Fifth Air.encr.ent privilege 
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efusal to provide income information did not in any way 
e the willfulness of his actions; Jensen's state of mind 
-vis his assertion of the privilege was "out of the case" 
:ould not, as a matter of lawf justify his failure to file 
:urn; and that Jensen could not mention the Fifth Amendment 
ilege or argue its applicability during his closing argu-
On appeal Jensen contends that: (1) an individual has a 
t to object, upon the Fifth Amendment grounds of self 
irdnation, to individual questions on a tax return, and the 
ie of the validity of one's assertion of his privilege 
:ld be submitted to a jury with appropriate instructions; 
a good faith, though erroneous, assertion of a Fifth 
ndnent privilege in response to an individual question on a 
return is a defense to a prosecution -for willful failure to 
e a return? (3) the district court erred in failing to 
>truct on the good faith defense, and its definition of will-
L did not explicitly include the good faith defense; (4) 
* district court improperly limited the argument of counsel; 
d (5) the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a 
asonable doubt the willfulness of his conduct or a lack of 
>od faith in asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I. 
Jensen contends that an individual has a right to object, 
pon the Fifth Amendment grcunds of self incrimination, to 
ncividual questions on a tax cturn. Jensen further contends 
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that once an individual has asserted his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege, the validity of the assertion must be submitted to the 
jury under appropriate instructions. Me disagree. 
The Fifth Amendment• privilege against self incrimination 
does not allow an individual to-refuse to provide any informa-
tion on a tax return. In United States v. Moore, 692 F.2d 95, 
97 (10th Cir. 1979) we stated: 
The Supreme Court has held the Fifth Amendment is not a 
defense for failing to* make any tax return, United 
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 
L.Ed. 1037 (1927), although a Fifth Amendment objection 
can be raised in response to a particular question on 
the return if • the question calls for a privileged 
answer- See Garner v. United States , 424 U.S. 648, ~96 
S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). This Court held in 
United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1012, 98 S.Ct. 725, 54 
L.Ed.2d 755 (1978) that a tax return containing no 
information but a general objection based on the Fifth 
Amendment did not constitute a return as required by 
the Internal Revenue Code, and did not contain a claim 
sufficiently specific to invoke Fifth Amendment protec-
tion. 
See also United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1979), 
cert, denied 444 U.S. 917 (1979). Ue hold Jensen was not 
entitled to make a blanket Fifth Amendment objection to com-
pleting the returns? accordingly, an instruction relative 
thereto was inappropriate. Although the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self incrimination may be emrdcved to orotect 
* -taxpayer from revealing an illegal source of income, it does 
not protect one from disclosing th* amount of his income. 
United States v» Brown, supra. 
Jensen contends that his rd faith, though erroneous, 
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serticn of his Fifth Amendment piivnege an response to an 
dividual question on a tax return is a defense to a prosecu-
oa fox—willful—failure-to- £ile-a tax_return^ This contention 
meritless. 
In United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) the 
ipreme Court held that willfulness in the context of the 
icome tax statutes "simply means a voluntary, intentional 
iolaticn of a known legal duty." That Jensen was fully aware 
f his legal obligation to file a completed tax. return by 
etting forth his earned income is revealed by the appropriate 
eturns he filed prior to 1977* The district court's rejection 
>f Jensen's good faith argument was correct: 
I'm going to instruct the jury that it is an 
established rule of law that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege doesn't excuse the taxpayer from his duty to 
prepare and file a tax return and it doesn't justify 
his* refusal to file a return within the meaning of the 
Internal Revenue Code. If that were the ca§e, anybody 
that had some notion about what the law is and that it 
would excuse them, however outlandish that notion is, 
they would have a good faith defense. 
[R.# Vol* V at p. 54]. Jensen's good faith reason for violat-
ing a known legal duty is irrelevant. '.United States v. Dillon, 
566 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 971 
(1978). Jensen.'s own rationalization of the protective 
parameters of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination is of nc moment, when, as h*re, he attempts to 
adopt an individual standard different from that applicable to 
the remainder of the citizenry „ In United States v. ware, 60S 
F.2d 400, 406 (10th Cir..1979) *t stated: 
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The defendant contends that his personal belief in what 
the law is, or should be, supersedes the federal 
Constitution and statutes as construed and applied by 
the Supreme Court* If each citizen is a "law unto 
himself, government will exist in name only. * See 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167, 25 
L.LQ. 244 (1879), and United States v. Grismore, 564 
F.2d 929, 932-933 (10th Cir. 1977). 
Jensen's contention that the district court erred in 
failing to instruct on his good faith defense is without 
merit. In United States v. Pomponio, supra, the Court specif-
ically held that where a trial judge adequately instructs on 
willfulness, M[a3n additional instruction on good faith [is] 
unnecessary." 429 'U.S. at p. 13. 
II. 
Jensen contends that the district court erred in ruling 
that he could not argue his good faith assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self incrimination during closing 
arguments. \Je hold the district court did not err in limiting 
Jensen's closing argument. 
As set forth above, the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self incrimination does not allow an individual to refuse to 
provide the amount of his income on a tax return. United 
States v. Moore, supra. Also, a demonstration of good faith is 
not a defense to a charge of willfully failing to file an 
income tax return, when, as here, it is shown that the defen-
dant intentionally violated his known legal duty to file a 
return. United States v. DiTlrn, supra. Under such circum-
stances, we hold the distric: court properly limited Jensen's 
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III. 
Jensen contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt his willfulness in fail-
to file appropriate returns and his lack of good faith in 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. \le hold the 
dence was more than sufficient to establish beyond a reason-
e doubt that Jensen willfully violated his known legal duty 
file a return* 
AFFIRMED. 
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"One need not be a criminal to claim Fifth Ammendment 
privileges, it applies to Civil suits as well." 
(Isaacs v U.S., 256, F2d., 654.) 
"The privilege is not ordinarily dependant upon the nature 
of the proceedings... It applies alike to Civil and Crimina] 
proceedings,..." 
(McCarthy v Arndstein, 266,U.S., 
34, 40.) 
";but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's 
own testimony, or of his private papers to be used as 
evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, 
is within the condemnation of that judgement." 
(Boyd v U.S., 116,U.S., 616, 630 
"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right 
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." 
(Simmons v U.S. 390, U.S., 377, 
394.) 
The Third District Court ordered Appellant to file; 
"'valid, accurate, and complete1 Utah individual income 
tax return forms TC40, for the taxable years 1979, 1980, 
and 1981, reflecting wages as income,..." 
(Finding of fact, conclusion 
of law and order pg. 7 (2a) ) 
or face incarceration for (30) days. 
(finding of fact, conclusion of 
law and order pg. 7, (2) ) 
The Third District Court's order, issued under authority of 
Mandamus (Mandate), amounts to the compelling of Appellant to 
surrender one Constitutional Right to assert another. 
This Order of the Court should not stand. 
ARGUMENT IV 
The unlawful attempt to convert the claim of a Constitutional 
Right into a crime, (contempt) 
The Appellant, a Natural Citizen, having NO DUTY to the State, 
and having insufficient "income" to be required to file an income 
tax return, cannot be compelled to disclose private information as 
to Appellant's wages, or "Compensation for Services," which do not 
constitute fIncome". 
